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Action for
for
,Judgment for defendants affirmed .
•Tames C. Pnrerll and .:Uicharl Hiorctan for
Bronson, Bronson & J\IrKinnon and John F. \Yard foe
Hespondents.
'l HAY~OH, J.~Plaintiti'
1

{·ntered
on a jury verdict m an action for
Plaint iff's
and evidence 1vas introduced to
illat as she
a
public side1valk defendants' police
upon and
]mocked ller dcrwn causing severe
that the clog had
a propensity to jmnp on people, that <1efendants knew of
this propensity, and that, notwithstanding this knowledge.
defendants allowed the
to roam at
restraint.
The defendauts' eYidence showed that the
dog with no propensity to jump on people and
it had
merely aceidentally bnmped into plaintiff \vhile
with
another dog.
Plaintiff does not question the sufficiency of the evidenct'
to support the judgment. Her sole contention is that the
court erroneously failed to instruct the jury in accordaJlC('
with the applicable rule of law.
There is no dispute as to that rule. [1] '"rhe keeper of
au animal of a species dangerous by nature, or of any animal
which he knows, or has reason to lmmv, to have dangerous
propensities, is liable, without wrongful intent or negligence:~
for (1amage to others resulting from such a propensity."
(Prosser, Torts, p. 432; Gooding v. Chutes
155 Cal. 620,
624 [102 P. 819, 18 Ann. Cas. 671, 28 L.H.A.N.S. 1071] ;
Clowdis v. F'resno Flume etc. Co., 118 CaL
320 [50 P.
373, 62 Am.St.Rep. 238] ; Heath v. li'ruzia, 50 Cal.App.2d
598, 600 r123 P.2d 560]; OpeZt v. Al. G. Barnes Co., 41 Cal.
App. 776, 779 [183 P. 241]; see 3 C.•T.S., "Animals,"
~ 148; cf. Civ.
§§ 3341, 3342.) [2] The liability of
the keeper is absolute, for " [t] he gist of the action is not
the manner of keeping the vicious animal, but the keeping
him at an with knowlrdge of the vicimlS propensities. [Citation.] In such instances the owner is an insurer against
the aets of the animal, to one who is injured IYithout fault,
and the question of the O\Yner 's negligence is not in the case.
[Citations.]" (Opelt v . ..ttl. G. Barnes Co., supm, 41 CaL
App. 776, 779.)
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hovvevcr,
an absolute duty,
;vith other instructions 2
It h; clearly apparent
of certain of plaintiff's proposed
modification of certain of her proposed inits \1-ithdrawaP of one of her proposed
it to the
, that the court undercare and so instructed
the court erred in rejecting plaintiff's proim;trnctions that the keeper of a dog, which he knows
kwe a
propensity, is under ar1 absolute duty
ram
aml in instructing the jury that such a
JS
UIJCler a
to exercise ordinary care to
restraill the
we do not believe that the error was preju11

' If the keeper of a dog knows that the dog was aec.ustomecl to jump
h nm::n
the
's
iH not affceted Ly the high
neighbors.
''Tbe,
upon a human Leing is
not mZJtcriaL
( 'Tf
knows .it to have
propensities, he is
it or eonilne it
may not exercise its
of another.
keeper of a dog to inform himself or herself
disposition of said dog.''
2
Tbey were immediately followed by an instruction that ''A keeper
must use that degree of care to restrain it that an ordinarily
person would have usod in the same or similar circumstances.''
>vas nlso instruch'd that "under the law of this state every
bound, witJ,ont contract. to abstain from injuring the person
of a,nother or from infTinging upon any of his rights, and
everyone is Tesponsihle for injury occasioned to another fo1· his want
care or skill in the management of his property or person.
was not an insurer of the safety of the plaintiff or
tl.e
(Pin inti ff 's Ill'oposed instruction No. 31, as moilified by tho
r~ourt 's alldition of the last sentence.)
3
Por example, plnintiff 's proposed instruction number 2: "The keeper
of nny dog which he knows or has reason to know to have dangerous
propensities is liable without wrongful intent or negligenee :for damages
to othns proximately resulting from sneh a propensity.''
'See, for
the modification of plaintiff's proposed instruction
number Hl,
note 2, supra.
5
Plaintiff 's proposed instruction number 2, quoted in note 3, supra.
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dicial. 'l'lle
not be
invoked unless the
tl1at
had
the alleged
but that defendants knew
or should have known that it had. In the
tradicted evidence and the instrudions that were
is clear that the jury did not believe that
alleged
or
should haye lmmn1 that it had.
evidence in this case on th(; issue of restraint the error would
baYe been prejudicial. The uncontradided eyidence affirmatively shows, hmvever, that defendants did
whatevPr
to restrain the
and allmved it to roam at will. Had the
jury believed that the
had the alleged
propensity and that defendants knew it or should have known it,
they were compelled
the instructions
to return a
verdict for plaintiff, for a showing of a complete lack of any
care to restrain the dog would show a violation of a duty to
use reasonable care to restrain it. It follo·ws that the jury
must have found that the
did not have th:~
dangerous propensity, or that defendants did not know or were not
charged with notiee of such propensity, and that a eontrary
result would not have been reached even if all the
instructions had been given.
The judgment is afiirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and
concurred.

.J.,

CAR'l'ER, ,T.-I dissent.
I had heretofore thought that at least one rnlc of law
remained firmly fixed in the jurisprudence of thi:s state : that
a party litigant was, at the very least, entitled to have the
jury correctly instructed as to the law as it related to his
particular la-vvsuit. The majority opinion frankly admits that
there is no dispute as to what the applicable rule of law is;
that plaintiff was entitled to instructions in conformity with
the rule; that the jury was clearly misinformed by the court
as to that rule of law.
The evidence was sharply conflicting as to >Yhether the dog
had dangerous propensities. If the dog did have dangerous
propensities, defendant was under an absolute duty to restrain
it. The matter is just as simple as that, but the jury was
not so instructed. It was instructed that defendant must
only exercise ordinary care.
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was that the
l1ad
propenwhich were known to defendant. She was entitled to
that theory :
the
P. 804] ; Ritckey v.
'Waniorek v. United RailKlamath etc. Oo. v.
P. 159); Oassi722
P. 748} ; Buckley v.
209 [89 P.2d 453) ; Lewis
ua"··LLU'tJ."-'U 455 [112 P.2d 747];
386 [223
& Oounty of
; Perin v. Nelson
; Rideau v. Los
124 Cal.App.2d 466
P.2d 772] ;
Bills v. Los
Transit Lines, 40 Cal.2d 630, 640 [255
795] ; Petersen v. Riesckel, 115 Cal.App.2d 758 [252
P.2d 986]; Bummers v. Randall, 123 Cal.App.2d 113 [266
P.2d
v.
124 Cal.App.2d 861 [269 P.2d
626].
A
law as it is given to it in
the
by the court. The rule is set forth
in 24 California
section 96, page 822, as follows : ''As a general rule instructions excluding issues or
cteJtenses which are
by
are prejudicially
If the jury is not instructed
erroneous.''
ease it must, in effect,
as to the law applicable to
how can
find for the defendant. Under the
that instructions giving only defendant's theory of
not
plaintiff? The majority indulges
Luocvi\J'll in order to decide just what the jury thought
its
The trial court was of the opinion
defendant
care was all that was required
was so instructed. The theory of plaintiff's ease
to the
of the jury and, as a
denied her
in court.
JUllginei1t should be reversed.
was denied June 23,
petition
a
was of the opinion that
petition should

